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Abstract 
The return of religion 
Religion is back in Philosophy as a respectable subject. Part 1 
first charts what MacIntyre, Taylor and Derrida have meant in 
this regard. Subsequently, it turns to the Enlightenment to 
determine what constituted the breakthrough. It is found that 
even where the Enlightenment gave maximum room to religion 
(i.e. as a civic religion and as “religion of the heart”) it still 
excluded a constitutive relation to a transcendent revelation.   
Part 2 centres on the religion-faith distinction in reformational 
philosophy. Similar to the Enlightenment, religion is understood 
as part of human nature. However, human nature itself is con-
ceived as intrinsically religious and depending for its light on 
revelation. Secondly, “religion” in this context also encompass-
es idols and religious substitutes. Thus, it directs attention to 
shopping malls, football stadiums, health policy, et cetera, as 
possible contexts of a return of religion. Examples show that 
this has become a popular approach. However, most of the 
publications surveyed fail to distinguish between an “analogical” 
and a “pistically qualified” use of religion, and are open to exag-
gerations (the shopping mall and football stadiums as temples, 
etc.). At this junction, the relevance is shown of the religion-faith 
distinction as well as of Elaine Botha’s theory of metaphors. 
The epilogue offers an integration of parts one and two.     
                                      
1 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Jonathan Tipping (Groningen) in checking 
my English. 
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Opsomming 
Die terugkeer van religie 
Religie is terug in die Filosofie as ’n waardige onderwerp. In 
Deel 1 word eerstens uitgestip wat MacIntyre, Taylor en Derrida 
in hierdie verband bedoel. Daarna word na die Verligting gekyk 
om te bepaal wat die deurbraak moontlik gemaak het. Die be-
vinding is dat, selfs waar die Verligting heeltemal plek gemaak 
het vir religie (as ’n siviele religie en as religie van die hart), dit 
steeds ’n wesenlike verband met ’n transendentele openbaring 
uitgesluit het. 
Deel 2 sentreer rondom die religie-geloofsonderskeid in refor-
matoriese filosofie. Ooreenkomstig met die Verligting, word 
religie as deel van die menslike natuur verstaan. Menslike na-
tuur word egter op sigself verstaan as wesenlik religieus en 
afhanklik van openbaring vir sy lig. Tweedens omvat “religie” in 
hierdie konteks ook afgode en religieuse plaasvervangers. Dit 
vestig dus die aandag op winkelarkades, voetbalstadions, 
gesondheidsbeleid, ensovoorts as moontlike kontekste van ’n 
terugkeer van religie. Uit voorbeelde kan gesien word dat hier-
die ’n populêre benadering geword het. Die meeste van die 
publikasies wat ondersoek is, versuim egter om tussen ’n “ana-
logiese” en ’n “pisties-gekwalifiseerde” gebruik van religie te 
onderskei en is oop vir oordrywing (bv. die winkelarkade en 
voetbalstadions as tempels). By hierdie kruispunt word op die 
relevansie van die religie-geloofsonderskeid gewys, sowel as 
op Elaine Botha se metafoorteorie. Die epiloog bied ’n inte-
grasie van dele een en twee. 
Part 1 
1. Introduction: return of religion 
Peter Berger, the noted sociologist, once said that, with respect to 
religion, he had made a huge mistake and had had a big insight. 
The mistake was that he had assumed a negative correlation be-
tween modernisation and religion. He had thought that development 
would cause a steady retreat of religion from the public domain. This 
assumption which he shared with standard modernisation theories 
was falsified by what in fact happened. The insight he prided himself 
on was to have foreseen a pluralisation of cults and religions 
(Polinder, 2010:6; cf. also Berger, 1979). 
In both respects Berger’s retraction is on target. Religious issues 
have not disappeared from the media or from the agenda of the po-
litical parties. In fact, the opposite may well be the case: there 
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seems to be reason to speak of a “return of religion”. Secondly, as 
Berger foresaw, the established churches have not benefitted from 
this return. What Europe showed instead was a proliferation of 
Christian denominations as well as a spreading of numerous he-
terodox cults. 
However, there is more to the return of religion than meets the eye 
of the sociologist. Berger’s rubrics do not fit all relevant develop-
ments. One has to turn to philosophy to get the broader picture.  
The first fact to take note of is, until not long ago, many philosophers 
subscribed to their own variety of the modernisation theories, as-
suming that, although religious issues still remained after decades of 
secularisation, it was not worth being taken seriously. Whenever 
these issues came up in philosophical gatherings, it was rare to find 
genuine openness. In this respect the philosophical climate did not 
differ much from the intellectual world at large. As Desmond relates:  
I remember a time when to mention God or religion in the com-
pany of advanced intellectuals was like mentioning sex in a 
prudish Victorian drawing room. An icy silence would descend, 
and the silence communicated more than the argument possibly 
could: we do not now talk of these things.  (Desmond, 2005:xi.) 
MacIntyre was one of the first to throw a stone into the pond. With 
respect to our subject, his book, After virtue (MacIntyre, 1981) marks 
a new phase. In this book he strongly takes issue with the prevailing 
uncritical acceptance of the is-ought divide in moral philosophy and 
the social sciences (the divide that was thought to keep religious 
issues at a distance). He warns that by insulating themselves, there 
would be no escape from “emotivism”, a position representing a total 
loss of substance. The book ends with a gloomy diagnosis: the “new 
dark ages (…) are already upon us”; “we are waiting (...) for another 
(…) St. Benedict” (MacIntyre, 1981:245). The reference to St. Bene-
dict indicates that his only hope for resistance was set on small, 
monastic-like communities of scholars fostering pre-enlightenment 
tradition. Later, in Whose justice, whose rationality? (MacIntyre, 
1988) he is clearer about how to overcome emotivism and regain 
substance by a rejuvenation of an Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.  
The first reaction of philosophers and social scientists on After virtue 
was one of bewilderment.2 But it did not take long for the book to 
                                      
2 I remember sociologist Jan Verhoogt, raising both hands in a seminar on the 
Future of the Welfare State when the phrase about the new Dark Age was 
The return of religion  
80   Koers 76(1) 2011:77-97 
become one of the classics of the century (Lemmens, 1999).3 
Although MacIntyre’s attempt to revive a neo-Aristotelian philosophy 
had little success, he succeeded in discrediting the standard views 
on religion. This left a fertile soil upon which, for instance, Charles 
Taylor could sow. 
The central message of Taylor’s Sources of the self (1989) is that 
the self cannot be understood (also not by itself) apart from historical 
sources. This book deals extensively with Christian sources, includ-
ing the Reformation era. Remarkably enough, it was well received 
by secular philosophers, and has been widely used in philosophical 
curricula.4 A decade later, his book A secular age (Taylor, 2007) fol-
lowed. Now the author not only covered a wider terrain, he also 
came more clearly to the fore as a committed Catholic, openly 
declaring that he neither could, nor would, doubt his own faith. 
Relevant to our subject is his rejection of “human flourishing” as the 
meaning and end of religion. He insists: “The injunction ‘Thy will be 
done’ isn’t equivalent to ‘Let humans flourish’, even though we know 
that God wills human flourishing.” (Taylor, 2007:17.) 
A third philosopher to consider is Derrida. In temperament and 
background he had nothing in common with either MacIntyre or 
Taylor. No wonder that those who know him only as the master of 
deconstruction will think that any return of religion would be malgré 
lui. However, Donner la mort (The gift of death, 1999) places his 
philosophy in a different light. Taking on the theme of sacrifice as 
developed by Patočka (1990), Levinas, and Kierkegaard, it express-
es a view of moral codes and ethical commands that break with the 
conventional insulation of ethics from religion. Ethics, it holds, not 
only has to concern itself with the universal, but also with absolute 
singularity (chaque homme est tout autre). To take singularity se-
riously means to enter the border zone with religion, as he puts it in 
a lengthy commentary on the biblical story of Abraham’s readiness 
to sacrifice his son: “Il ne peut donc plus distinguer si aisément entre 
l’éthique et le ’religieux.” (Derrida, 1999:117.) Granted, the religious 
                                                                                                             
quoted. Although sharing MacIntyre’s Christian faith, he failed to see how this 
book could have relevance for his own field: it seemed yet another product of a 
neo-Romantic sub-current (as exemplified by the then popular works of 
Christopher Lasch and Ton Lemaire). 
3 At a symposium on worldview at Calvin College (1985), Jan Verhoogt read a 
paper that did show affinity with MacIntyre (cf. Verhoogt, 1989:134).  
4 Which does not mean there was no critique (cf. Heyns, 2002). 
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here remains a border zone. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
Derrida seriously considers the possibility that Abraham did hear 
God’s voice. But one thing is clear: he no longer sides with those 
defending an autonomous morality. One wonders whether he would 
not also have agreed with Taylor that the meaning of “Thy will be 
done” cannot be explained in terms of some inner-worldly good, 
such as the enhancement of human life! 
More about these three philosophers in the concluding section of 
Part 1. 
2. Dialectics of the Enlightenment  
The information gathered so far, suggests that nowadays religion is 
being taken more seriously by philosophy than it was before. It 
seems safe then to say that there is indeed a return of religion. 
However, the next question is whether a real breakthrough has 
occurred, or not. To answer this question the standard enlighten-
ment view of religion will be taken as point of reference, and more 
specifically its assumption that all religions are branches of one 
trunk. We’ll turn to this assumption first. Thereafter the ideal of a civil 
religion as well as the Romantic quest for authenticity, will be 
explored. To conclude the first part of this study, the positions of 
Derrida, MacIntyre and Taylor will be reconsidered.  
The second half of this study is dedicated to the distinction between 
religion and faith in reformational philosophy. Only then will it finally 
be possible for us to determine what does and what does not 
constitute a genuine return of religion. 
2.1 Truncus communis  
Historically, the decisive step the Enlightenment took was to aban-
don the traditional bibliocentric view of history (which had already 
become weakened in the Renaissance era). Sacred history became 
relegated to one section of the book of history. By the same token, 
Christianity became demoted to an instantiation of religion-in-gene-
ral. Religion, it was thought, is the same at the root, but differs in its 
branches.  
A further distinction can be made between negative and (more) posi-
tive views of religion. Skeptics and atheists considered an appeal to 
God or gods as rooted in some human-all-too-human desire for 
consolation and hence as something mankind will have to forgo in 
its further development. It was also possible, however, to attribute 
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an indispensable function to religion in the education of humankind 
(Lessing, Herder, Kant), or even, as Hegel did, raise it to the level of 
the “absolute religion” as the pinnacle of religious evolution. How-
ever, no matter how negative or positive the view of religion, in all 
cases Christian religion is interpreted as a special manifestation of 
the religion of mankind.   
Up to the present day, the heirs of the Enlightenment boast of 
having created a public order in which religions have been cut down 
to size and consent to being treated on an equal basis. The result is 
often described as a “privatisation of religion”. But this formulation is 
not entirely adequate. It is not adequate in Kant’s case, since reli-
gion, as he conceives it (i.e. within the bounds of reason), is indis-
pensible for public morality. It is even less fitting in Hegel’s case, 
given his doctrine that the principles of the modern state (the 
equality of all citizens before the law, etc.) depend on the Christian 
religion for their contents. What is rejected, is any claim to ex-
clusivity. 
An assessment of the Enlightenment cannot be negative only. 
Dooyeweerd’s treatment of this subject is exemplary in keeping a 
balance between critique and appraisal. After a trenchant critique of 
the ground-motive leading the age of reason, he concludes on a 
positive tone.  
There is indeed another side to our assessment of the En-
lightenment faith. We would be entirely amiss if we failed to 
recognize its great significance for the unfolding of western 
civilization. The Enlightenment was formative in history and 
active in opening culture beyond the scope of natural science 
and technology based on that science. (…) With respect to the 
legal order it pleaded untiringly not only for the establishment of 
the individual rights of man, which form the foundation of 
today’s civil law (…). The Enlightenment also laid many corner-
stones for the modern constitutional state (Rechtsstaat). 
(Dooyeweerd, 1979:107.) 
The words unfolding and opening are significant. It indicates that the 
criterion for assessment is the contribution to an unfolding of poten-
tials, including the potentials of the Christian religion. Viewed from 
this angle, we are not dealing with a religion being forced to con-
cessions, but rather with the crucible of the Enlightenment helping to 
bring out the strength of the former. Similarly, the separation of 
church and state is no longer associated with suggestions of con-
cessions wrought upon the former, but is understood as an unfolding 
of a relationship doing justice to the inner nature of both church and 
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state. Precisely because it is the nature of the church to make itself 
serviceable to a transcendent truth, its disputes cannot be settled by 
state officials – their jurisdiction being restricted to matters of public 
interest.5 Unfortunately, it is akin to the Enlightenment to see this se-
paration as something forced upon the church. Starting with the 
correct premise that the state is no arbiter in religious matters, it 
concludes that all religions be regarded as equally true, false or 
useful, and that directional differences between religions are merely 
“questions about words and names” (Acts 18:15). What it cannot 
and will not accept, is that equality before the law implies a restric-
tion rather than an extension of civil authority. 
2.2 Civic religion  
Until the eighteenth century it was impossible to conceive of a so-
ciety without religion. Pierre Bayle was probably the first to defend 
that a society of atheists was possible in principle. Spinoza tended 
towards the same conclusion. Together they represent what Israel 
(2007) has called the radical Enlightenment. However, this is not the 
end of the story, as the supremacy of reason on which they set their 
hopes did not remain uncontested either. A century after Spinoza, 
Rousseau conquered Europe with a plea for the supremacy of 
sensibility. Thus he opened a back door to a return of religion, for it 
now became charged with the task of fostering a nationwide sense 
of solidarity. This idea of a “civil religion” gained widespread cur-
rency. The cult of l’Être Suprême during the French Revolution, with 
Robespierre as its high priest, was inspired by it, but so was the 
religion du cœur idealised by Madame de Staël who was then the 
most vocal opponent of the radical revolution! (Winock, 2010:201-
239). All through the nineteenth century philosophers of religion 
continued to pay tribute to Rousseau (Hegel, Comte, and Durkheim 
among others).  
Rousseau’s “civil religion”, Robespierre’s cult of l’Être Suprême and 
Mme de Staël’s religion du cœur all centered on a form of Deism 
allegedly free of doctrines and hence without risk of divisiveness. It 
was in turn further secularised by Comte and Durkheim and 
transformed into a religion of mankind void of any transcendence.  
Why this reaching out for the post-Christian? It was because the 
architects of civil religion had no use for the antithetical elements of 
                                      
5 I am alluding here to the norm of “sphere sovereignty” (soevereiniteit in eigen 
kring).  
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the Christian faith. What to do with a Savior who announces that He 
has come “to turn a man against his father, a daughter against her 
mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law” (Matt. 10:35)?6 
This shows that all these projects remain caught in the dialectics of 
the Enlightenment. The only religion condoned in the public realm 
was to be a generic, unhistorical religion. In fact they all project the 
idea of a generic religion-of-mankind into a post-Christian future. 
In this regard, Hegel is the only exception, because his variety of a 
civil religion is pegged to an existing religion, namely the Christian 
religion. He derided Robespierre’s cult of the Supreme Being as a 
worship of an empty abstraction. He insisted that civil religion has to 
come to terms with historical Christianity. I must admit, however, 
that Hegel’s own position is complicated. His Lectures on the philo-
sophy of religion ends with declaring that religion has to flee to the 
realm of philosophy, because only there the gates of hell shall not 
prevail against it (Hegel, 1966:231; 1987:300). On the other hand, 
he was enough of a realist to admit that philosophy will never cap-
ture the hearts and the imagination of the people, and, therefore, in 
his social and legal philosophy, orthodox (= trinitarian) Christianity 
holds pride of place.  
Does Hegel’s brand of civil religion present the breakthrough we are 
looking for? No and yes. No, because it was for the want of some-
thing better that he turned to historical Christianity. There is ample 
evidence to suggest that, for the cementing function, he would rather 
have relied on philosophy but realised it lacked in popular appeal. 
Yes, because his turn to history broke through the dialectics of the 
Enlightenment. Thus he reluctantly contributed to the nineteenth-
century’s rehabilitation of historical Christianity, of which “our own” 
Groen van Prinsterer was such an eminent representative, and 
without which (humanly speaking) the neo-Calvinism of Abraham 
Kuyper could not have developed. 
2.3 The quest for authenticity  
The transition from the Enlightenment to the era of Romanticism 
was marked by a shift in emphasis from reason towards the authen-
ticity of feeling and striving. Rousseau had been a precursor in 
cultivating sensibility. The ideal was no longer the all-rounded per-
sonality and the even-development of all capacities under the gui-
                                      
6 Compare the gripping dialogues in Dostoevsky (2002).  
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dance of reason, but the single-minded pursuit of ideals. What 
should interest us is an attendant change in the meaning of religion, 
as found in Madame de Staël’s novel Corinne. In this novel, which 
caused a sensation when it appeared in 1807, the protagonist 
explains the meaning of l’amour fou:  
S’il y a quelque chose de religieux dans ce sentiment, c’est 
parce qu’il fait disparaître les autres intérêts, et se complaît 
comme la dévotion dans le sacrifice de soi-même. (Winock, 
2010:297.) 
Of course, content-wise, little was gained. The content of this pas-
sionate “religion” could vary from deism in Herder’s and Madame de 
Staël’s case, to the Christian faith among a new generation of apo-
logists such as Lamennais and Chateaubriand. The latter showed 
indeed that the amour fou could also be Christ-directed. As he put it 
in his review of Madame de Staël’s work on literature published in 
1800: “Ma folie, à moi, est de voir Jésus-Christ partout, comme Mme 
de Staël la perfectibilité.” (Winock, 2010:184.) 
What these different contents have in common, is the anthropolo-
gical ideal of authenticity, or to put it differently, they share an alle-
giance to what Taylor has called “expressivism”.7 
Authenticity (or expressivism) is to be credited as a potential break-
through, for it creates a climate in which central elements of (the 
Christian) religion may come to fruition – the same elements the 
Enlightenment tends to suppress, such as loyalty to tradition, single 
minded dedication, and the subordination of all concerns and per-
sonal aims to one dominant end. Even in cases where expressivist 
doctrines were animated by an irrationalist spirit as it was in the 
case of Madame de Staël’s “foolish love”, a revolution was wrought 
at the anthropological level ending the reign of the typical en-
lightened ethos that owed much to a neo-Stoic ideal of inner tran-
quility (Lipsius, Spinoza), and little or nothing to the passionate reli-
gion of the Bible … for zeal for your house consumes me (Ps. 69:9). 
3. Transition 
MacIntyre, Taylor and Derrida, the three philosophers introduced in 
our earlier survey, have all benefitted from the revolution just men-
tioned. Their work displays a trend that can no longer be contained 
                                      
7 Taylor (1975:13, footnote 1) credits Isaiah Berlin for having dubbed this term.  
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within the boundaries of the Enlightenment. And this in turn has 
made religion once more a subject to be taken seriously.  
However, on closer examination we discover spots where it be-
comes uncertain whether the break-through has materialised fully. 
This is most obvious in Derrida’s Donner la mort, as said before, 
since the author does not seem to be serious in rendering the bib-
lical account of how Abraham was stopped by a voice from heaven 
when on the verge of sacrificing his son. Reading between the lines 
one cannot but conclude that for Derrida, Abraham’s decision re-
sulted from an inner dialogue, and nothing more. 
MacIntyre’s Achilles’ heel is his account of the origins of traditions. 
He states more than once that all origins are contingent (MacIntyre, 
1981:118, 119; 1988:354-355, 360-361), giving no evidence that his 
own (Aristotelian-Thomistic) tradition would be exempted. What it 
means is that all traditions initially depend on circumstantial factors 
that could just as well have been different. By the same token, to in-
sert oneself into an existing tradition, becomes something for which 
there are never universal valid reasons to quote, and cannot but 
remain a matter of choosing one out of several options. Simply put, 
whether a person is religious or secular would initially be contingent. 
Once a road is chosen, it is only by proceeding along this road that a 
person could hope to find good reasons for having started where 
she/he did, and eventually reach a point at which a claim to uni-
versality would be warranted. As After virtue puts it with respect to 
moral traditions:  
[....] without those moral particularities to begin from there 
would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in moving forward 
from such particularity that the search for the good, for the 
universal, consists (MacIntyre, 1981:205).   
Granted, to some degree MacIntyre’s arguments are convincing. At 
a certain level allegiance to a specific religion is indeed one par-
ticular possibility next to others. If most people are more aware of 
this than their ancestors were, it is because the pluralist predicament 
Peter Berger spoke of makes itself much more felt today than it did 
in the past. Here a distinction is in order between religion as a his-
torical phenomenon, that is, as a specific tradition, and what comes 
from the Beyond – its revelatory core.  
Taylor’s A secular age (2007) continues to impress. It is one pro-
longed effort at rehabilitation of a much despised tradition. However, 
there is one assumption of modernity he is not ready to give up, 
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accepting as a fait accompli the transition “[....] from a society in 
which it is virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which 
faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility 
among others” (Taylor, 2007:3). This transition is believed to be ir-
reversible. In a certain sense, he is right. Undeniably, the pluralist 
predicament makes itself felt so strongly nowadays that unbelief 
easily succeeds in giving itself the appearance of normality. But 
because Taylor fails to account for the revelatory side, the con-
tingency gains more weight than necessary. Although Taylor cannot 
be expected to be at peace with the Enlightenment assumption that 
religion is nothing but a human possibility, he appears ready to 
accept a compromise according to which religion (faith) is essential 
for believers but not quite so for non-believers. 
I may find it inconceivable that I would abandon my faith, but 
there are others, including possibly some very close to me, 
whose way of living I cannot in all honesty just dismiss as 
depraved, or blind, or unworthy, who have no faith (at least not 
in God, or the transcendent). Belief in God is no longer 
axiomatic. There are alternatives. (Taylor, 2007:3.)  
Part 2 
4. All of life is religion 
The final part of this study is dedicated to the relevance of the reli-
gion-faith distinction as developed by reformational philosophy.8 
Important about this conception of religion is, firstly that it breaks 
with the ingrained anthropocentrism of the Enlightenment. Charac-
teristically, the Enlightenment conceives of religion as a human cre-
ation. This does not seem to be far removed from the Reformation, 
for the latter has always stressed that religion pertains to human 
nature. The rub is, however, that human nature is assumed to be 
responsive to God, and that religion is entirely placed in this light. 
Religion is the response to the gift of life. To have made this 
abundantly clear is the lasting contribution of Abraham Kuyper’s 
Stone lectures.9 Both conceptions relate religion to human nature, 
but, whereas the one interprets nature as malleable, the other inter-
                                      
8 For a complementary view of the same relationship, see Olthuis (1985).   
9 On religion as a gift, Kuyper insisted that “the starting-point of every motive in 
religion is God and not Man” (cf. Kuyper, 2000:46). Compare Dooyeweerd 
(1953:33): “the modal meaning of faith ... is by its nature related to divine 
revelation”. 
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prets this nature primarily as a datum, and (true) religion as an amen 
to this gift.   
Apart from a difference in depth, there is also a difference in 
breadth. As for the Enlightenment, religion is a human possibility 
that at best has a function in the pursuit of happiness and self-per-
fection, but is never indispensable. In principle, human self-en-
hancement could be reached too, if not better, by a philosophical 
pursuit of truth or through transforming life into a work of art. In 
contrast, a central tenet of the Reformation is that religion is not op-
tional. It holds that humans are inescapably religious and, put sim-
ply, will either serve God or idols. This enabled reformational philo-
sophy to develop a conception of religion that both encompasses 
positive religion and its substitutes, ranging from overt idol service to 
the “-isms” of academic and everyday life, such as the many 
varieties of naturalism as well as idealism and spiritualism, and not 
to forget secularism.  
The strong point of this conception is that it broadens the scope of 
what phenomena could signal a “return of religion”. This would mean 
that the developments introduced in the previous sections are not 
the sole indicators, but that the return may as well take place in the 
form of a virulent naturalism spreading from the universities to the 
public square.  
5. Faith  
Whereas religion is used for the basic thrust and overall-direction of 
the life of a person, or group of persons, faith is linked to one 
specific modality, that is the pistic aspect/function. As I see it, the 
great merit of a functional (or modal) approach is that it forces us to 
gain clarity as to how a particular phenomenon is qualified. It forces 
us to always ask: is this or that phenomenon of a faith-type or rather 
an analogy within another sphere of life? Take for example a trans-
action concluded in good faith (bona fide): obviously, this is not a 
full-fledged faith, but rather a faith-analogy within the juridical sphere 
of life. Other examples will follow later. Firstly, what does qualify as 
properly “pistical”?  
Taking our cue from Dooyeweerd’s systematic philosophy, the first 
thing to note is that faith is designated as the “boundary aspect”, in 
the sense of marking the boundary of time and eternity. One may 
think of the affirmative moment in a response to the Word, such as 
Mary’s response to the Annunciation: “May it be to me as you have 
said.” (Luke 1:38.) Such an affirmation before the face of God 
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(coram Deo) transcends the particularities of a context. It is an amen 
for better or for worse, come what may.  
Let it be added immediately, however, that kneeling before an idol 
may fall into the same category of the pistical. Standing for a func-
tion (mode or aspect), faith is not narrowly defined. It is not restricted 
to a specific content. As Vollenhoven’s (2005:26) introduction to 
philosophy puts it: “Belief (faith) is not identical with faith in Christ; all 
people believe, but not everyone believes in the Christ of God.”10  
Secondly, the affirmation should be worldviewish qua breadth – at 
least, that is what I conclude from Dooyeweerd’s illustrations. As we 
will see, each of those illustrations implies a view of the origin, mea-
ning and destiny of life. The first illustration regards the affirmation of 
the world as created – but note once more that the antonym of faith 
finds a place here too.  
The majestic words that open the book of Genesis, ‘In the 
beginning God created the heavens and the earth,’ ought to 
determine the content of our faith with reference to creation; for 
heaven and earth, together with all that has unfolded in them, 
are within time objects of either this faith or an apostate faith 
that turns away from the revelation of God’s Word. (Dooye-
weerd, 1979:90; parallel in Dooyeweerd, 1953:33.) 
The  second  illustration shows  that  also the affirmation  of  some  
“-ism” may qualify – but only if an idea of totality is implied.   
By relating the origin of all things to an eternal flux of life, the 
pagan nature religions made all creatures the objects of their 
primitive faith. The same holds for the modern evolutionist, who 
believes that whatever lives has come forth from one original 
source. (Dooyeweerd, 1979:91.) 
Having isolated a criterion to decide what properly pertains to the 
“faith”-aspect and what not, the task at hand is to apply what is 
gained to our theme of the return of religion. I’ll argue that only phe-
nomena that are pistically qualified (i.e. belong to the sphere of faith) 
contribute to the return of religion-theme, in contradistinction to other 
phenomena that will be classified as analogical and metaphorical.  
                                      
10 Mark that Vollenhoven (2005:77) relates religion to how humans respond to the 
first commandment: “You shall love the Lord your God.” Dooyeweerd’s use of 
religion is less focused, but I don’t know whether this indicates a substantial 
difference. 
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As the matter of metaphors is very much Elaine Botha’s perch (cf. 
Botha, 2007), we better be careful not to speak slightingly about 
“metaphorical”, for instance as a mere stepping-stone towards the 
conceptual! However, our aim is not to disqualify the use of religious 
metaphors within a philosophical discourse, but simply to promote a 
better understanding of the religion-faith distinction. 
6. Idols of our time 
At the time of the recent World Cup in South Africa, it was not un-
common to hear from Dutch pulpits commentaries comparing the 
football to an idol, stadiums to temples, referees to priests, and the 
public to a flock of religious enthusiasts. In a certain sense this kind 
of commentary properly applies the all of life-religion principle. A 
problem arises, however, when football at World Cup level is 
assumed to be a surrogate faith at a level with the Baal cult in Old-
Testament times. 
A similar but more subtle case is the interpretation of consumerism 
by James Smith, a former student of the Institute for Christian Stu-
dies (Toronto), now teaching at Calvin College. I quote from a glow-
ing review of his recent study in theology of culture.  
For instance, Smith suggests that the mall is ‘actually a 
religious space suffused with practices that constitute a kind of 
worship … rituals of ultimate concern that are formative of our 
identity’ (Smith, 2009:93). The mall’s version of the kingdom is 
‘I’m broken, therefore I shop’ (sin and/or need); ‘I shop, there-
fore I am’ (identity and salvation). (Sibley, 2010:33; cf. Smith, 
2009:93-103.) 
It seems fully warranted to state that Smith considers western con-
sumerism to be a full-fledged faith with its own kind of worship, its 
own rituals, pursuing its own ultimate concern. If he is right, it would 
be an illusion to think it is possible to use the things of the mall “as if 
not engrossed in them” (1 Cor. 7:31); the atmosphere being so 
much charged with religious energies that even to enter it for a 
Christian would mean to compromise his/her faith.   
I think Smith’s “theology of culture” does have a function in raising 
awareness of directional issues in present-day culture. My concern 
is, however, that it suffers from a systematic misrepresentation of 
what does and does not constitute idol worship.   
Of course, Smith could appeal to precedent cases within the tra-
dition of reformational philosophy, to wit Zuidema’s book on the de-
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cline of communism wherein he likens the Marxist doctrines to 
creeds, the party to a church and the leaders to mortal gods (Zui-
dema, 1957). We may also think of Schuurman’s interpretation of 
modern technological culture as a “Babel culture”. A telling example 
was his valedictory lecture at the University of Delft, the cover of 
which showed Pieter Bruegel’s painting of the Tower of Babel 
(Schuurman, 2002). Verkerk’s inaugural address at the University of 
Maastricht would be yet another example. His subject was the 
idolisation of health and security. He described the preventive killing 
of goats to stop the spreading of the Q-fever as a kind of holocaust 
on the shrine of health and security (Verkerk, 2010). Do we not have 
to conclude that the theology of culture is firmly established in this 
tradition? 
A worldviewish breadth seems to be the only criterion to distinguish 
between proper faith-type phenomena (i.e. pistically qualified) and 
metaphors having their moorings in faith-analogies within other 
spheres of life. Zuidema’s case is the most clear, since there was a 
worldview at stake, i.e. Marxism-Leninism. Obviously, we are here at 
the level of faith and anti-faith, the return of religion here having 
taken the shape of an anti-faith. By the same token, the decline of 
communism could not but leave a deep religious void. The present 
situation in Russia shows how much foresight there was in Zui-
dema’s diagnosis.  
The volume Christian philosophy at the close of the twentieth cen-
tury (which counted Elaine Botha among its contributors) contains a 
lucid defense by Schuurman of his choice of technicism as the “best 
formulation for the secularized motive of creation and redemption 
…” (Schuurman, 1995:191). Thus he describes its “(hidden) ideolo-
gy”:  
Technicism entails the pretension of autonomous man to 
control the whole of reality: man as master seeks victory over 
the future; he is to have everything his way; he is to solve 
problems old and new – including the problems caused by 
technicism – and to guarantee – as a possible consequence – 
material progress. (Schuurman, 1995:191.) 
He holds that to speak of a technological worldview is more satis-
factory than to speak of a scientific or economical worldview. His 
point is that technicism has greater depth and breadth than scien-
tism (Dooyeweerd) or economism (Goudzwaard). I do not want to be 
a judge in this matter, but do want to say that it is very proper for 
Schuurman to offer such a defense of his position lest his theme of 
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the Babel culture be taken as an exercise in stretching metaphors 
belonging to a preconceptual level of philosophising.  
Returning to our earlier examples of consumerism and football-as-
an-idol: here the worldviewish dimensions seem to lack. Is what the 
consumer buys in the shopping mall automatically transformed into 
an article of faith? This seems doubtful. The conclusion must be that 
consumerism does not qualify as a full-fledged (apostate) faith. If 
this is true, then describing the shopping mall in religious terms does 
not get beyond an exercise in metaphors without a fundamentum in 
re. The same would be true of stadiums as temples, or following 
Wright, of Superman as a (corrupt) imitation of Christ.11 
7. Mouths speaking great things 
Finally, there is one more possibility to consider: that of something 
trying to usurp divine power. Simon the magus’s attempt to buy the 
power of God (Acts 8) is a model of this kind of usurpation. It has 
many parallels in our days, although mostly not as clear-cut as 
Simon’s case. 
The obvious illustration is a full-blown ideology. It is not necessary 
that it clad its intentions in religious terms and metaphors. To return 
to Marxism-Leninism: although banning all God-talk, it provoked in 
fact an interpretation such as Zuidema’s. The crucial thing to look for 
is whether an ideology closes the window on eternity by arrogating 
to itself the right to divine the true interests of man, and mobilising 
religious energies towards its own immanent goals. 
Philosophy by nature seems to be less arrogant than ideology, and 
much farther removed from Simon the magus’ wish to buy the power 
of God. Yet, everyone who has wrestled with secular philosophies 
will appreciate what Mekkes used to advise his students, viz. to look 
closely at who/what gets the first and final word. This question 
directs the attention towards the way a philosophy positions itself. 
Does it aspire to place itself between us and the Origin? Does it try 
to wipe away the horizon? 
                                      
11 Wright, 2000:3 states:  
A defence of a would-be ‘supernatural’ Jesus can easily degenerate 
into a portrayal of Jesus as a first century version of Superman – not 
realizing that the Superman is itself ultimately a dualistic corruption of 
the Christian story.  
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To answer these last questions it sometimes helps to watch how a 
philosophy is being “lived”. For instance, in the case of Hegel, it is 
highly interesting to consult the testimonies of his students (for in-
stance on the occasion of his death). One then comes to realise that 
this philosophy did in fact serve as a guide for the religiously per-
plexed, Hegel’s admonition that philosophy should not try to be “edi-
fying” notwithstanding.12 In a recent essay I related a similar expe-
rience with respect to Neo-Kantianism.  
In 1998 at the conference of the Internationale Hegel-Gesell-
schaft, hosted by the University of Utrecht, I read a paper on the 
Hegel-reception among Neo-Kantians. A passage from Rick-
ert’s commemorative essay on Max Weber instantly awoke the 
audience. Here was Rickert (not exactly a light-footed philo-
sopher) speaking of a Logosfreudigkeit bordering on mania, 
occasioned by the discovery of theoretical insights. (Griffioen, 
2010:134.)13 
Even a philosophy wary of speculation and seemingly not given to 
speak “great things” may still fall under this category, because it 
threatens to block the way to the Origin and close off the horizon. 
From this vantage point it becomes easier to appreciate Smith’s 
“theology of culture”. Does not much of contemporary advertisement 
aim at tapping religious energies for commercial purposes? Some 
years ago a Dutch advertisement appeared around Easter with a 
text ending with het is volbracht (“it is finished”). This phrase was not 
used accidentally. As was found out later, the text of the advertise-
ment originated with a lapsed preacher who, of course, hoped that 
these words still reach hidden strata of the secular mind. To visit a 
North-America plaza in the Christmas or Easter season, is enough 
to agree that the mall has been turned into a place of quasi-worship. 
8. Epilogue 
In the first part of this essay we registered some positive develop-
ments. MacIntyre’s After virtue did not remain without influence. 
Philosophy now shows more openness towards religion than in the 
past. On the other hand, the pluralisation Peter Berger brought to 
                                      
12 See the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit: “... Die Philosophie aber muß 
sich hüten, erbaulich sein zu wollen …” (Hegel, 1980:14). 
13 “ (....) die Freude, oder selbst mania, des Entdeckens neuer Einsichten” 
(Rickert, 1926:234).   
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our attention turned out to be a mixed blessing, as it implies both an 
unblocking of religious energies and a mounting Babylonic confusion 
of tongues. However, in this last respect we could derive some 
consolation from the second part of our journey. The distinction 
between religion and faith has enabled us to see through muddled 
waters and distinguish between pistically qualified phenomena on 
the one hand, and on the other hand, the many attempts to worm a 
way into the sphere of faith from another sphere. These last at-
tempts lack the wherewithal to satisfy religious needs lastingly. 
Strange as it may sound, it is some consolation to realise that, 
although religious needs are manifold, the means to satisfy these 
needs are restricted to those forms that do open a window on 
eternity. It means that neither consumerism nor the glamour of sport 
will be able to forge a return of religion as they please. Come what 
may, but the North American shopping mall, the Olympic stadiums 
of Beijing and the football stadiums of South Africa will not develop 
into holy places of a new paganism. 
On the other hand, Vollenhoven reminded us that faith (the pistical) 
only figures here as a function, that is, as denoting a mode of being, 
rather than a specific content. Therefore, having left behind with a 
sigh of relief the many pseudo-religions puzzling Berger, we are 
faced with an even more perplexing problem. The problem is how to 
distinguish between what is true and what is false in modes of faith 
that functionally speaking, all have the same qualification. 
Elaine Botha’s Metaphor and its moorings comes to our rescue 
(Botha, 2007). It does so by helping to assess realistically the limits 
of conceptual control. More specifically, it helps to avoid the pitfall of 
what she calls the “double language thesis”. According to this thesis 
a clear-cut distinction distinquishes “between literal and meta-
phorical language use” (Botha, 2007:114). She shows that Dooye-
weerd subscribed to some version of it by suggesting that properly 
developed concepts and ideas would leave all traces of figurative 
speech behind (Botha, 2007:113-116). But then she points in 
Dooyeweerd at what I would call a happy inconsequence: “Although 
he did not refrain from employing metaphorical language in his own 
systematic philosophical exposition (the image of the prism for the 
notion of time for example …)” (Botha, 2007:115). Why “happy”? To 
explain this point I turn to the by now familiar metaphor of the 
“window on eternity”, an image Dooyeweerd probably borrowed from 
Kuyper’s Lectures on Calvinism. When it is said that the shopping 
mall lacks such a window, we all know what is meant, although the 
metaphor does not convey any conceptual or ideational knowledge. 
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How is it nevertheless able to direct our attention? I guess it is 
because it packs into an image something central to all genuine 
religions, viz. a basic intuition that human destiny transcends this 
world. Also when this intuition develops into knowledge, and starts 
functioning within creeds and theologies, it remains dependent on 
an external source for its meaning. Metaphors may well be the only 
way to do justice to this open character. 
All avenues lead to one conclusion: ultimately there is no other ap-
peal than to (some) revelation. This especially holds for the pressing 
question of what are true and what are blind windows. Although for 
many people such a conclusion presents an insufferable sacrificium 
intellectus, for others, it is a cause for rejoicing. Certainly, also the 
latter would love to extend their conceptual grasp, if only to be more 
effective in their dealings with agnostics and religious pluralists, but 
they can be consoled by realising that the finiteness of human un-
derstanding indicates that (true) faith can only be a gift. Indeed: faith 
is a gift, and it is for keeps. 
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